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We grew up founding our dreams on the infinite promises of American
advertising. I still believe that one can learn to play the piano by mail
and that mud will give you a perfect complexion.
Zelda Fitzgerald
VER the last several decades, consumer marketing theory has
acquired a sophistication previously absent in the marketplace.
Marketers now recognize many factors beyond advertising that
motivate consumer sales. For example, the purchase of major consumer
products such as automobiles and durable goods is greatly influenced by
the activities of a salesman in the store. While advertising and other mar-
keting devices get the consumer to the shop, something more often is nec-
essary to motivate the consumer to part with his money. In major
transactions it is the salesman who often pushes a vacillating consumer
into a purchase. Without this extra push, an important sale might be lost.
The role of a salesman often is nonexistent, however, in the purchase of
an inexpensive product such as soap or tissue paper; but even here human
behavior is so complex that marketers often have difficulty pinpointing the
precise consumer motivation for a purchase decision. Consider the follow-
ing statement:
Motivation is always multiple and complex. There is seldom just
one reason for doing anything. When a person buys an automobile he
may do so because he needs transportation and wants to extend his
horizons and wants to keep up with the Joneses and surpass the
Smiths and proclaim his solvency and status to the world and experi-
ence the mastery of controlling a powerful new engine, etc. While
these motives are apt to have different degrees of importance to differ-
ent people, they are all likely to be involved to some extent in a
purchase of a new car.'
Merely advertising the specific attributes of a product is no longer suffi-
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cient; sellers must scrutinize everything from the placement of a product in
a store, to the catalogues furnished to potential purchasers, to the slightest
detail in a television advertisement. Consumer preferences as to color and
style of packaging, the person who appears in television advertising, and
the effect of advertising and other marketing devices are studied carefully.
Even so, every year many new and established products fail to inspire
mass consumer purchases. Exactly what causes these changes in consumer
behavior eludes even the most thoughtful marketer. John Wanamaker, a
New York department store tycoon, recognized the complexity of con-
sumer behavior generations ago, as reflected in his remark to the effect that
"I know I waste half the money I spend on advertising. I just don't know
which half."
This Article focuses on the popular assumption that consumers rely
upon one or more statements by a seller in deciding to purchase a product.
One consequence of this assumption is that the law requires plaintiffs in
many products liability cases to prove they relied upon a particular state-
ment in deciding to purchase a product. A much more realistic view is that
embodied in modem marketing theory: a complex combination of mar-
keting factors interplay with one another and result in a buying decision.
Even if a plaintiff sincerely believes a given statement caused a purchase,
no one can be certain the statement actually resulted in the sale. Because
many of the influences on consumer purchasing operate at a subconscious
level, asking plaintiffs to prove that a label or a catalogue or an advertise-
ment or the like caused them to purchase a product is an unjustifiable legal
burden in light of current marketing techniques.
The time has come, therefore, for the statutory and case law to be re-
vised to eliminate the element of reliance when a cause of action is brought
on a theory of product misrepresentation or breach of warranty when a
product causes personal injury. In lieu of the reliance element, the courts
should permit a rebuttable presumption that reliance on a representation
exists unless proven otherwise by the defendant. This Article develops the
rationale for this conclusion by exploring some of the changes that have
occurred in marketing behavior and theory in recent decades and by ap-
plying this knowledge to present-day legal requirements for establishing a
claim based on a seller's misrepresentation of a product.
I. CHANGES IN CONSUMER MARKETING: IMPACT ON THE GROWTH OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
One factor of great significance to the whole problem of misrepresenta-
tion is the change in the marketing environment itself.2 Gradually, over a
period of years, the retail business in the United States changed from a
number of small, locally owned shops, which very often produced the
goods they sold, to large impersonal chains such as K-Mart, Safeway, and
2. For a discussion of the impact of changes in doing business on marketing, see
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
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Sears. The owner of a store may no longer be available to dissatisfied
customers; instead such customers often must deal with salespersons hired
frequently with inadequate backgrounds about the products they are sell-
ing and who are provided scant training. The effect of this radical change
from small stores, where purchases were often made on the advice of a
local store owner familiar with the product, to purchases made at a self-
service store, is profound. With no one to consult, consumers have been
forced to place increasing reliance on the marketing of a product and, in
particular, on the advertising of a product.
Consumers began to receive information from new sources as they lost
contact with individual store owners. Information increasingly comes not
from salespersons, newspapers, and magazines, but from television or ra-
dio advertising. The amount of information transmitted in a thirty-second
television spot is far less than can be conveyed in a magazine or newspaper
where the reader has time to examine the material carefully. On televi-
sion, the advertiser must get its message across to the public quickly
through a series of verbal and visual images. One result of this transfor-
mation has been an explosion of product liability claims.3
Does this suggest anything about the law of misrepresentation? If noth-
ing else, because mass media product promotion and advertising, as op-
posed to direct contact with the seller, is responsible for most consumer
information, this type of information should be carefully scrutinized. To
the extent mass media advertising provides misleading information to the
public, we should bear in mind that such information might have a sub-
conscious effect on consumer behavior even though an injured plaintiff
cannot recall seeing or hearing the advertisement in question.
II. THEORIES OF RECOVERY
A number of different theories of recovery are available to plaintiffs
who desire to base a claim on a false statement appearing in an advertise-
ment: fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of warranty, and inno-
cent misrepresentation. 4 In the earliest products liability suits, plaintiffs
sought recovery based on fraud.5 The difficulties of proving a case based
3. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT (1978). The
Task Force estimated that between 60,000 and 70,000 product liability claims were filed in
1976 and concluded that the number of pending claims increased substantially between 1971
and 1976. For a discussion of the number of injuries caused by products used around the
home, see U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT (Part
Two). The Consumer Product Safety Commission estimates every year nearly 36 million
product-related injuries occur that require medical treatment or some limitation in normal
activity. The magnitude of injuries suggests special attention is merited in this area as it
likely will continue to be a fertile field for litigation.
4. Arguably, two prerequisites must be established in every products liability case
based on an advertisement: (1) does the advertisement contain a commitment; and (2) has
the commitment been breached? 1 G. ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING
§ 14.03 (1978). For an outstanding article on the problem of representations appearing in
advertisements, see Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection.- Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liabilityfor Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
5. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 111 (1979). "That fraud or deceit
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on fraud led to the development of the tort of negligent misrepresentation;
unfortunately, this tort also presented difficult problems of proof.6 Breach
of warranty next gained popularity as a theory of recovery, 7 and more re-
cently, the courts have adopted the concept of innocent misrepresentation.
Strict liability in tort may also provide a remedy where certain products
are inherently dangerous, but since this cause of action does not involve a
seller's representation, it is discussed only tangentially in relation to inno-
cent misrepresentation. Finally, federal consumer regulation of deceptive
advertising cannot be overlooked as an emerging response to the inade-
quacies of common law and state statutory law on misrepresentation.
A. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
A seller's intentional falsehoods regarding a product or the attributes
thereof for the purpose of deceiving a purchaser may give rise to a com-
mon law cause of action. The action is based on fraudulent or deceitful
misrepresentation and accrues when the purchaser is injured by the prod-
uct. Although establishing a case of fraud or deceit is difficult,8 the neces-
sary elements9 include the following: (1) a material misrepresentation
that is false and ordinarily one of fact;' 0 (2) knowledge or belief on the
part of the defendant that the representation is false or that he does not
have a sufficient basis of information for the misrepresentation;"1 (3) in-
tent to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon the
may provide the basis for a product action is well established. Such an action is one in
Tort .... Its usefulness is narrowly limited, since a plaintiff must prove all of the six ele-
ments of a traditional fraud case." Id See, e.g., Alpine v. Friend Bros., 244 Mass. 164, 138
N.E. 553 (1923) (plaintiff sought unsuccessfully to recover for injuries sustained while eating
bread with tin mixed in it).
6. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 5, § 111. Only when an inaccurate statement
has been made by the defendant, without any reasonable basis for believing it to be true, will
the courts impose liability for negligent misrepresentation. Phillips, A Synopsis of the Devel-
oping Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317, 326 (1978-1979).
7. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 5, § 112; see, e.g., Bahlman v. Hudson Motor
Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939) (plaintiff brought suit claiming statement in
advertisement that vehicle was "A Rugged Fortress of Safety" constituted express warranty
of quality and construction).
8. 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 17.01 (1980); Annot., 75
A.L.R.2d 112, 140 (1961). For an extensive discussion of misrepresentation, see Strand v.
Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
9. See L. FRUMER et al., PERSONAL INJURY § 1.03[l] (1969); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§§ 525, 526 (1938).
10. Of course, the plaintiff must establish that a misrepresentation was made by the
manufacturer. Thus, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's advertisement stated
"20,000 doctors say that Camel cigarettes are healthful" or "Camel cigarettes are harmless to
the respiratory system," the plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action for death caused by
smoking Camel cigarettes because the defendant showed it did not make the alleged claim.
Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256 F.2d 464 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 875
(1958).
11. The courts are not in agreement whether scienter, knowledge on the part of the
person making a representation that the representation is false, is necessary in an action for
deceit. Most jurisdictions do require it. L. FRUMER et al., supra note 9, § 1.03[2]. See Hol-
land v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 126 S.E.2d 442 (1962) (defendants recommended
using product for cleaning drains although they had actual knowledge product was danger-
ous for this purpose).
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misrepresentation; (4) justifiable reliance upon the representation by the
plaintiff in acting or refraining from acting; 12 and (5) damage to the plain-
tiff as a direct result of his reliance.
Difficulty most often is encountered in attempting to distinguish fact
from opinion, and in proving reliance. For example, in Toole v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc. '3 the plaintiff developed cataracts after using defendant's
drug MER/29. In attempting to convince the appellate court to overturn
the jury's verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of fraud, the defendant ar-
gued, among other things, that the statements it made concerning MER/29
were mere expressions of scientific opinion made to physicians and that
there was no evidence of reliance upon any of the statements by the plain-
tiff.' 4 While the court agreed that in an action for fraud and deceit the
misrepresentations must be of fact and not opinion, the court relied on an
exception to this rule to uphold the verdict. If "the party making the rep-
resentation has superior knowledge or special information, the representa-
tions may be construed as fact and not opinion."' 5 On the issue of
reliance, the court decided that there was evidence indicating the plaintiffs
physician relied upon the advertisements and the plaintiff relied upon the
physician. The court thought the jury could make a reasonable inference
that the statements came to his doctor's attention and the doctor relied
upon them. Thus, there was sufficient evidence as to fraud to warrant sub-
mitting the case to the jury.' 6
12. See, e.g., Dobbin v. Pacific Coast Coal Co., 25 Wash. 2d 190, 170 P.2d 642 (1946)
(plaintiff not permitted to recover because he did not see advertisement until after purchas-
ing product); Evans v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 49 Ga. App. 744, 176 S.E. 843 (1934) (evidence
of statement in Sears catalogue properly excluded as no evidence presented that plaintiff
bought in reliance on statement).
13. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
14. 60 Cal. Rptr. at 410. The company had represented:
(a) MER/29 is virtually non-toxic, (b) it is remarkably free from side effects;
(c) it is a proven drug; (d) it has been administered under controlled condi-
tions to more than 2,000 patients for periods up to three years; (e) there is no
longer any valid question as to its safety or lack of significant side effects;
(f) MER/29 has a unique, specific and completely safe action.
Id at 411.
15. Id The statements in question were made by detailmen and in advertisements in
medical journals and periodicals. The court found that the company had superior knowl-
edge as to the effect of the drug.
16. Id. at 412. See also Wechsler v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 198 Misc. 540, 99
N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1950). In this case arising out of the death of a man as a result of
administration of a drug manufactured by the defendant, the court found sufficient facts for
fraud. The defendant knew of the drug's fatal propensities, but concealed this fact in its
communications with the medical profession. The court stated that even though the repre-
sentations were made to physicians, as opposed to the general public, reliance could be sup-
plied "by the circumstance that the physician who prescribed the drug was acting on behalf
of the intestate and the fraud committed on the doctor, was, therefore, a fraud upon the
intestate." 99 N.Y.S.2d at 590. See also Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. School of Medicine,
20 Cal. 2d 713, 128 P.2d 522 (1942). In Wennerholm the plaintiff took a drug falsely repre-
sented by defendants to be harmless. With respect to the issue of reliance in an action for
fraud, the court found evidence of reliance by both the patient and the physician. 128 P.2d
at 524.
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B. Negligent Misrepresentation
While few people would differ as to the obligation of the law to impose
sanctions on sellers who intentionally misrepresent the characteristics of
their wares, other theories of recovery involve less culpable behavior. The
conduct of the seller in such a situation may be quite innocent, but the law
imposes liability because the buyer has been in some manner misled. In
other words, the law imposes liability on the seller not because the seller
has acted wrongfully, but because the consumer was misled by something
the seller did.
An example is the common law theory of negligent misrepresentation.
Negligent misrepresentation is defined as a false representation made by a
person who has no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true, though
he does not know the representation is untrue or perhaps even believes it
to be true. 17 The courts do not punish the negligent seller for morally
reprehensible behavior. Instead the law says that the seller must exercise
greater care with respect to his representation. To the extent a seller care-
lessly misleads a buyer to the buyer's detriment, the seller must pay for any
personal injuries the buyer sustains.
To hold a seller liable for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff must
establish justifiable reliance on a statement negligently made. 18 The in-
ability to prove reliance, however, often forecloses the plaintiffs cause of
action. For example, in Kapp v. Bob Sullivan Chevrolet Co. 19 the Arkansas
Supreme Court found that although an automobile dealer's advertising
praised the dealer's cars, the plaintiff could not recover for injuries sus-
tained due to defective seat belts because the dealer made no representa-
tion as to the quality or performance of the seat belts.20 Even assuming a
specific statement has been made with respect to a particular product, the
possibility always exists that a court will regard it as puffing. For example,
in Evans v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 21 a Georgia court found that a Sears
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1152 (4th ed. 1951). Pursuing a case under negligent
misrepresentation as opposed to fraud probably will be of little benefit to the plaintiff. Kim-
ble and Lesher observe: "Although liability for negligent misrepresentation causing injury is
now well established, a claim of negligence is often hard to prove even when the representa-
tion on which it is based is patently false and the resulting injury clear." W. KIMBLE & R.
LESHER, supra note 5, § 111, at 148. Negligence has been found in Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe
Co., 276 N.Y. 172, 11 N.E.2d 718 (1937) (child died of infected blister caused by shoes that
had been represented orally and in advertising as embodying every proven principle of
health); International Prods. Co. v. Erie R.R., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, cert. denied, 275
U.S. 527 (1927) (negligent representations with regard to stored goods); Crist v. Art Metal
Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496 (1930), aft'd, 255 N.Y. 624, 175 N.E. 341 (1931)
(toy revolver that was advertised as harmless set fire to whiskers on Santa Claus suit).
18. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 (1974).
19. 234 Ark. 510, 353 S.W.2d 5 (1962).
20. 353 S.W.2d at 9-10. In another automobile case, the court found that the plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action that the defendant's advertising encouraged people to drive
too fast. The plaintiff was hit by a car going 115 mph. Schemel v. General Motors Corp.,
261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966), afl'd, 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
945 (1968). See also Neider v. Chrysler Corp., 361 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 491
F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1974) (advertising for Plymouth GTX emphasized speed).
21. 49 Ga. App. 744, 176 S.E. 843 (1943). But cf Dewar v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 49
[Vol. 35
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catalogue was evidence properly excluded as mere sales talk.
C. Breach of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code
A plaintiff may also find a cause of action when a seller breaches a prod-
uct warranty. Liability is imposed on a seller for reasons similar to the
imposition of liability for negligent misrepresentation because the seller is
not acting immorally. Nonetheless, a guarantee is given to the buyer that
the courts insist the seller must honor. Three warranties are created by the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), including the express warranty, 22 the
implied warranty of merchantability, 23 and the implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.24 Note that in contrast to fraudulent, negligent,
and innocent misrepresentation, a cause of action for breach of warranty is
based on state statutory law; however, many pre-Code cases upheld com-
mon law warranty actions.
Before an injured person can recover for a breach of warranty, the exist-
ence of at least one of the three Code warranties must be established.
L Express Warranty Under Section 2-313. No particular formal words
need be used in order to create an express warranty. The use of words
such as "warranty" or "guarantee," for example, is not necessary. The
words need not indicate a specific intention on the part of the seller to
make an express warranty 25 and they may be oral or written.26
N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (court found cause of action based on purchase of product in
reliance upon defendant's claim of competence and care in manufacture of washing ma-
chines).
22. U.C.C. § 2-313 provides:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affir-
mation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to
the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform
to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commen-
dation of the goods does not create a warranty.
See generally Note, Express WarrantiesArisingfrom Ads, 41 J. AIR L. & COM. 497 (1975).
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1976), has had a major impact on the creation, content, and enforcement of
warranties in nonpersonal injury cases. See Clark & Davis, Beefing up Product Warranties.-
A New Dimension in Consumer Protection, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 567 (1975).
23. U.C.C. § 2-314.
24. Id § 2-315.
25. The court must look at all of the facts and circumstances, along with the language in
the advertisement in question, to determine if a warranty has been created. In a number of
cases the court has found an advertisement to constitute an express warranty. See, e.g.,
Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975), modified& af§'d, 591
1981]
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An express warranty comes into existence under Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-313 in one of several ways: by an affirmation of fact or
promise,27 by a description of the goods,28 or by a sample or model.
29
Each of these methods results in the creation of an express warranty only if
a second condition occurs: that it becomes part of the "basis of the bar-
gain."' 30 The Code specifically provides that "an affirmation merely of the
value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opin-
ion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty." 3' In some
cases, it may be important to determine whether an express warranty, im-
plied warranty of merchantability, or implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose was created because the Code provides different rules for
the exclusion or modification of different types of warranties. 32 Thus, a
F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978); Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681
(1975); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Markovich
v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958); Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958). See also Annot., 75
A.L.R.2d 1 (1961).
26. This point is important in bringing a case based on a radio or television advertise-
ment, as such advertisements are oral in content.
27. See, e.g., Klages v. General Ordnance Equip. Corp., 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 356, 367
A.2d 304 (1976) (man injured by robber while using mace gun that allegedly would stop
people in their tracks).
28. See, e.g., Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., 89 S.D. 497, 234 N.W.2d 38 (1975) (label
stated "for control of corn rootworm larvae (insecticide)").
29. The sample or model need not be displayed physically in the plaintiffs presence. A
number of cases have found an advertisement to constitute an express warranty. In an early
case, Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939), the court
held that the statement in an advertisement that the automobile in question was "A Rugged
Fortress of Safety" amounted to an express warranty of quality and construction. 288 N.W.
at 310, 312-13. Two leading cases that found advertisements to be express warranties were
Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 143 N.E.2d 612 (1958), and
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958). Rog-
ers and Markovich had substantial impact on the drafting of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402B (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
30. U.C.C. § 2-313.
31. Id. (emphasis added). If a statement is not mere seller's talk, the courts generally
find the advertising statements to be express warranties. See, e.g., Sylvestri v. Warner &
Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350
F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987, modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W.
309 (1939); Randy Knitwear v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226
N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583
(1965); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent, 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958). See also
2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, § 16.04[4][a] (1981).
32. U.C.C. § 2-316 provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wher-
ever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of
this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limita-
tion is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any
implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicu-
ous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it
[Vol. 35
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manufacturer or retailer wishing to exclude a warranty must do so with
care to be certain the exclusion is effective. Moreover, to recover for per-
sonal injuries sustained as a result of a breach of warranty, the plaintiff
must establish that he is in privity of contract with the seller or a third-
party beneficiary of warranty. The persons who may recover vary from
state to state, depending on which alternative of Code section 2-318 a par-
ticular state has adopted. 33 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 34 abrogated the requirement of establishing
privity altogether to recover from the manufacturer or the retail dealer. A
state following this case should permit a plaintiff to recover from a seller
with whom the buyer is not in privity of contract even though the state
may have adopted Alternative A of section 2-318. 35
The Uniform Commercial Code does not explicitly require reliance in
express warranty cases, and the official comments to section 2-313 indicate
reliance need not be established. 36 Nonetheless, some confusion has oc-
curred in the courts over this issue because of the "basis of the bargain"
states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warran-
ties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or
other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's
attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that
there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined
the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circum-
stances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course
of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the
provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on con-
tractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
33. U.C.C. § 2-318 provides three alternatives:
Alternative A
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his
home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.
A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative B
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural per-
son who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
Alternative C
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any person who
may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and
who is injured by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit
the operation of this section with respect to injury to the person of an individ-
ual to whom the warranty extends. As amended 1966.
34. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
35. See note 33 supra.
36. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3.
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terminology. Regrettably, the Code does not define this phrase; however,
the comments do give us some insight into what the phrase means. Under
the Uniform Sales Act, which preceded the Uniform Commercial Code,
reliance by the buyer was required in order to establish an express war-
ranty.
37
It appears that the Code does not require proof of reliance in order to
establish an express warranty. Comment 3 to section 2-313 states that "no
particular reliance on such statements need be shown in order to weave
them into the fabric of the agreement. '38 Although the Code uses the ter-
minology "basis of the bargain" rather than reliance, arguably there is no
great difference between the terms.39 Even so, the analysis of an express
warranty case should be in terms of the "basis of the bargain" rather than
reliance. This is particularly true when we are concerned with statements
made in advertising that were never heard or read by the purchaser prior
to purchase. If there was an affirmation of quality in the statements, al-
though the buyer did not rely upon this affirmation in making the
purchase, he still arguably has a cause of action under breach of express
warranty.4° The basic test is: Did the affirmations of fact or promises
made by the seller, did any descriptions, or any samples or model exhib-
ited become a part of the basis of the bargain? If so, an express warranty
has been created. If not, no express warranty exists.4'
37. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 12.
38. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3. However, the same comment continues: "[A]ny fact
which is to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirma-
tive proof. The issue normally is one of fact." Id This seems to suggest that a statement is
presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain and that the burden of disproof is on the
seller. In any event, such proof may be unnecessary because liability need not be grounded
on express warranty. The plaintiff might instead pursue the case under an implied warranty
of merchantability.
39. 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE
§ 6.01 (1980).
40. See R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 68 (1970). Courts differ as to whether an
unread advertisement constitutes a warranty. See Annot., supra note 8, at 128-33. A minor-
ity view holds that an unread ad may form the basis of an express warranty. See I G.
ROSDEN & P. ROSDEN, supra note 4, §§ 14.03(2), 14.06. The Rosdens disagree: "[W]e be-
lieve that [such a view] cannot stand scrutiny. For if an advertisement is to amount to a
promise, knowledge of such promise would seem to be one of the minimal requirements for
success." Id § 14.06. See also W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 5, § 92 ("[A]n express
warranty can be created by advertisements leading to the purchase, provided that the buyer
can demonstrate his justified reliance on the statements in the advertisements." (Emphasis ad-
ded.)). One could argue, however, that the value of the warranty is included in the cost of
the product and the seller should be estopped from denying his warranty on public policy
grounds. D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL 31 (1974). Of
course, if a plaintiff realizes he must establish a particular statement as part of the basis of
the bargain, he may falsely state he was aware of the statement.
41. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 40, § 68. Nordstrom lists two principles to aid in decid-
ing these cases, although each case must turn on its facts: (1) the promise or description
must be interpreted before it can be determined whether there has been a warranty covering
the particular defect; and (2) the Code requires that the statements of the seller (or the
description, sample, or model) become apart of the basis of the bargain. "If the resulting
bargain does not rest at all on the representations of the seller, those representations cannot




Although there is disagreement whether an advertisement must be seen
prior to purchase, the Code does not require that an express warranty be
created prior to the time the parties enter into a contract. Moreover, lan-
guage used after the contract was entered into may create an express war-
ranty, and the Code does not require consideration for a modification of a
contract.42 One could at least make the argument, therefore, that if a per-
son views an advertisement after a purchase, then the advertisement be-
comes part of the basis of the bargain between the parties. The plaintiff,
however, still has the problem of establishing that he read or saw the ad-
vertisement. 43
Assuming the seller advertised its product, must the person who is bring-
ing suit establish that the express warranty was part of the basis of the
bargain between him and the defendant? Code section 2-31844 permits
someone other than the original purchaser to recover for breach of war-
ranty; thus, one may reasonably argue that the injured party need only
42. The drafters of the U.C.C. noted:
[T]he precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or sam-
ples are shown is not material. The sole question is whether the language or
samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the contract. If the
language is used after the closing of the deal . . . the warranty becomes a
modification, and need not be supported by consideration if it is otherwise
reasonable in order.
U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 7.
43. The injured party should not have to establish that something stated in the adver-
tisement became part of the basis of the bargain between the injured party and the defend-
ant. The fact that the purchaser regarded a statement as part of the basis of the bargain
should be sufficient. This position is that adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402B, Comments j, i; see Mannsz v. MacWhyte
Co., 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946). In MacgWhyte the injured party had not purchased the
wire tape that resulted in his death. Nonetheless, the court stated that the plaintiff "endeav-
ored to prove that the contents of MacWhyte's manual came to King's knowledge and he
bought the wire tape because of the representations contained in it. [The plaintiff] failed in
this proof but in our opinion it was unnecessary to make it." Id at 451. Because the manual
was widely distributedto purchasers and prospective purchasers, the court thought this to be
sufficient proof of reliance. However, the plaintiff lost in this case because he used the prod-
uct wire for a purpose not intended by MacWhyte. Id
The court in MacWhyte seems to be saying that if a company distributed a manual, the
purchaser can be assumed to have relied upon the manual. The user in turn may avail
himself of the purchaser's reliance. While this approach with respect to reliance is unusual,
it represents a more realistic view towards proving reliance than the typical court's analysis.
The possibility exists that a purchaser could come into contact with an advertisement and
be influenced, at least subconsciously, by it. One could extend this analysis even further and
argue that although a purchaser never read an advertisement, a friend of his may have done
so. This friend, without even mentioning the advertisement, may have influenced the in-
jured party in making his or her selection. Philip Kotler made the following observation:
Groups that have the most immediate influence on a person's tastes and opin-
ions are face-to-face groups ...
The powerful influence of small groups on individual attitudes has been
demonstrated in a number of social-psychological experiments ...
For the marketer, this means that brand choice may increasingly be influ-
enced by peer groups.
P. KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 111 (2d ed. 1967).
44. U.C.C. § 2-318, Alternative A. Section 2-318 therefore does not require that an
injured plaintiff prove his or her own reliance on or even awareness of the seller's warranty.
This is in accord with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402B, Comment j,
which states that the reliance in question need not be that of the injured party.
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point out that the express warranty was part of the basis of the bargain
between the original purchaser and the defendant. In Randy Knitwear, Inc.
v. American Cyanamid Co. 45 the manufacturer of a resin asserted in trade
papers and on labels the effectiveness of its chemical in preventing
shrinkage. A garment manufacturer brought suit to recover damages
based on a breach of express warranty. Although no direct contractual
relationship existed between the resin manufacturer and the garment man-
ufacturer, the court found the case raised substantial fact issues that pre-
cluded summary judgment for defendant.
The problem of determining when a given statement constitutes an ex-
press warranty and when it merely is puffing or sales talk certainly adds a
degree of unpredictability in relying upon an express warranty in a prod-
ucts liability case. 46 The official comments to section 2-313 shed some
light on whether a seller's statement is an affirmation of value, opinion, or
commendation. While section 2-313(2) seems to state in unequivocal lan-
guage that an affirmation as to value or a statement purporting to be the
seller's opinion or commendation of goods does not create a warranty, the
official comments indicate the test is: "What statements of the seller have
in the circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis of
the bargain?" 47 This again raises the question of what is the basis of the
45. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962). A review of the express
warranty cases involving advertisements makes clear that advertisements were used as a
device to avoid the requirement of proving privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant. See, e.g., Thomas v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 806, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 454 (1967); Simpson v. Powered Prods. of Mich., Inc., 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d
555 (1963); Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973);
Spiegel v. Saks 34th St., 43 Misc. 2d 1065, 252 N.Y.S.2d 852 (App. Div. 1965), affid, 272
N.Y.S.2d 972 (1966); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d
612 (1958); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, adhered to on rehearing,
168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
46. See R. NORDSTROM, supra note 40, § 70.
The line between warranty and puffing is one that evades specific rules. The
problem is that of determining the basis of the bargain-the justifiable expec-
tations of the buyer-and words that are warranties in one situation can be
sales talk in another, depending upon their impact on the resulting bargain.
The answer is to be determined by the trier of fact from the surrounding cir-
cumstances and the manner in which the words were used.
Id
47. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 8. The comment also notes that the provisions of subsec-
tion (2) were added to clarify the fact that while statements of the seller do ordinarily be-
come part of the basis of the bargain "common experience discloses that some statements or
predictions cannot fairly be viewed as entering into the bargain." Id
In applying the test suggested by comment 8, Duesenberg and King suggest the courts
employ an objective rather than a subjective standard; in other words, what was the buyer
led to believe and what could he justifiably rely upon? Thus the authors would inject the use
of the term reliance into a court's analysis. They also suggest that perhaps the seller should
be given no leeway in advertising-that it must be absolutely truhful. 3 R. DUESENBERG &
L. KING, supra note 39, § 6.05.
In numerous cases the courts have found that statements made by the seller to the buyer
constitute puffing. Many courts feel those types of statements are to be expected in a sales
situation. See, e.g., Ginnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1969); Rogola v. Silva, 16 Ill. App. 3d 63, 305 N.E.2d 571 (1973); Young & Cooper, Inc. v.
Vestring, 214 Kan. 311, 521 P.2d 281 (1974); Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons, 337 Mass. 312,
149 N.E.2d 635 (1958); Carpenter v. Albert Culver Co., 28 Mich. App. 483, 184 N.W.2d 547
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bargain and whether an opinion or commendation can become part of the
bargain. Moreover, if the official comment liberalizes what can create an
express warranty, the question arises as to what weight the courts should
place upon the official comments in interpreting the statutory language.
2 Implied Warranty of Merchantability Under Section 2-314. The im-
plied warranty of merchantability arises by operation of law and not as a
result of any language in the contract between the buyer and seller.4 8 The
fundamental concept for purposes of merchantability under Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-314 is that the goods "are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used."'49 Consequently, some determi-
nation of the ordinary purposes of a particular product is required to es-
tablish the existence of this warranty. For example, shoes that are fit for
ordinary walking are not unmerchantable if they are unfit for mountain
climbing, because mountain climbing would not be an ordinary use of
walking shoes. Where a manufacturer inadvertently uses an ingredient
causing sterility in its feed, and fails to label the feed properly, the manu-
facturer has breached the implied warranty of merchantability.5 ° Like-
wise, where the manufacturer of a golf training device advertises its ball as
"Completely Safe Ball Will Not Hit Player," and the golfball hits a buyer
on the head while he uses the device, the product is unfit for its ordinary
purpose.5' Goods not only must do the job for which they were made, but
(1970); Performance Motors, Inc. v. Allen, 280 N.C. 385, 186 S.E.2d 161 (1972); Newmark v.
Gimbel's, Inc., 102 N.J. Super. 279, 246 A.2d 11 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), aftd, 54 N.J.
585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Scovil v. Chilcoat, 424 P.2d 87 (Okla. 1967); General Supply &
Equip. Co. v. Phillips, 490 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. (1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a'
sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used;
and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties
may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-314.
49. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) & Comment 8. Comment 8 also indicates that this warranty
protects a person buying for resale. To be merchantable, goods must be honestly resalable
m the normal course of business.
50. Kassab v. Central Soya, 423 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
51. Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1975).
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also must do the job safely.5 2
Additional elements needed to establish an implied warranty of
merchantability include (1) proof that the goods are not merchantable and
(2) that a merchant made the statement.5 3 One of the chief advantages in
pursuing a case based on the implied warranty of merchantability is that
the injured party need not demonstrate the product was defective; how-
ever, the plaintiffs burden to establish that the goods are not merchantable
arguably eliminates this advantage.
A positive feature about pursuing a case under the implied warranty of
merchantability, as opposed to breach of express warranty, is the absence
of a need to establish that the statement became part of the basis of the
bargain 5 4 For this reason, the injured party may be able to prevail under
the implied warranty of merchantability whereas he could not do so under
an express warranty. The plaintiff does not have to establish an awareness
of an inadequate representation when an injury arises from the failure of
the product to meet ordinary expectations. These expectations are pre-
sumed.55 For this reason a plaintiff might be better off bringing a case
under an implied warranty of merchantability theory. 56
3. Implied Warranty of Fitness Under Section 2-315. Another warranty
that arises in a sale of goods is the implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose.57 This warranty under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-
315 has two facets: (1) the seller must at the time of contracting have "rea-
son to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required" and
(2) "the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or fur-
nish suitable goods."' 58 In contrast to the implied warranty of mer-
52. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 40, § 76.
53. U.C.C. § 2-314.
54. See, e.g., Steiner v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir.
1975); Ball v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 519 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1975); Robinson v.
Williamsen Idaho Equip. Co., 94 Idaho 819, 498 P.2d 1292 (1972); Eichenberger v. Wilhelm,
244 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1976); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d
69 (1960); Vitro Cow. of America v. Texas Vitrified Supply Co., 71 N.M. 95, 376 P.2d 41
(1962); Hinderer v. Ryan, 7 Wash. App. 434, 499 P.2d 252 (1972); S-Creek Ranch, Inc. v.
Monier & Co., 509 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1973). Some states do seem to require reliance. See, e.g.,
Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d 744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977); McDaniel
v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976).
55. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c). That reliance is assumed in an action brought under § 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also seems clear. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
29, § 402A, Comment c; Phillips, Product Misrepresentation and the Doctrine of Causation, 2
HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 561 (1974).
56. See 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, § 16.04[4][b] (1981).
57. Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315.
58. Id The seller is not required to have actual knowledge. Section 15 of the Uniform
Sales Act required that the buyer make known to the seller the particular purpose for which
the goods were required. This requirement was deleted from § 2-315. Now, the seller has
reason to know if the circumstances "are such that the seller has reason to realize the pur-
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chantability, the implied warranty of fitness does not require a statement
from a merchant. 59 A "particular purpose" differs from the "ordinary pur-
pose for which such goods are used."' 60 The concept of merchantability
covers uses that are customarily made of goods;6' on the other hand, a
"particular purpose" envisages some specific use that is "peculiar to the
nature of his [the buyer's] business."' 62 An example of a particular purpose
is found in Filler v. Rayex Corp. ,63 where a high school student sued the
manufacturer of baseball sunglasses for the loss of his right eye. During a
game, a fly ball hit the right side of his sunglasses, shattering the right lens
into sharp splinters that pierced his right eye. The injured plaintiffs coach
had purchased the sunglasses after reading an advertisement indicating
that they were designed for baseball players and would provide instant eye
protection.64 The court noted that the glasses were not fit for baseball
players, the particular purpose for which they were sold, thus the implied
warranty of fitness had been breached.65
To recover under the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, one must establish reliance. 66 The statement in question must still be
established as having been a factor in deciding to enter into a transaction.
The plaintiff must establish reliance on the seller's skill or judgment to
select or furnish suitable goods. This requirement of reliance poses serious
factual problems for the injured party but while the seller need not have
actual knowledge of the buyer's particular purpose or of the buyer's reli-
ance on the seller's skill and judgment, the buyer actually must rely on the
seller.67 In examining the question of the plaintiffs reliance, the court will
need to examine the degree of the seller's knowledge of the buyer's re-
pose intended or that the reliance exists." If this is the case, actual knowledge need not be
established. Id, Comment 1.
59. A merchant is defined as:
[A) person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
Id § 2-104(I).
60. Id § 2-315.
61. If a buyer merely has used the goods in an ordinary manner, the implied warranty
of merchantability is sufficient. A number of cases have used the implied warranty of fitness
when it was unnecessary. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 40, § 78.
62. U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 2.
63. 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970).
64. Id at 337. The advertisement read: "Play Ball and Flip for Instant Eye Protection
with Rayex Baseball Sunglasses Professional Flip Specs." A cardboard box was labeled:
"Baseball Sunglasses-Professional Flip-Specs" and stated "Simply flip ... for instant eye
protection." A guarantee inside each box provided "Rayex lenses are guaranteed for life
against breakage."
65. Id at 338.
66. See note 39 supra and accompanying text; for implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, see footnote 136 infra and accompanying text.
67. U.C.C. § 2-315, Comment 1. Innumerable cases require reliance. See, e.g., McKee
v. Brunswick Corp., 354 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1965); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal
Co., 436 F. Supp. 91 (D.C. Tenn. 1977); Fogo v. Cutter Laboratories, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 3d
744, 137 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1977); Brescia v. Great Road Realty Trust, 117 N.H. 154, 373 A.2d
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quirements and the degree of the buyer's reliance on the seller's skill and
judgment.68
D. Innocent Misrepresentation
The final step away from liability based on blameworthy conduct to lia-
bility based purely on a seller's misrepresentation of some product charac-
teristic is innocent misrepresentation. 69 The seller's conduct in this
situation is assumed to be free of any intent to injure or mislead the buyer.
Nonetheless, the seller's actions have misled the purchaser in such a fash-
ion as to cause direct physical injury to the plaintiff. We are generally
dealing here with a completely honest and fair seller who, through no in-
tentional or negligent act, and without any express or implied guarantee,
misled the party using the product. This common law theory of innocent
misrepresentation is found in section 402B of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts .70
The rule in section 402B applies to:
any misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or
quality of the chattel sold which is made to the public by one so en-
gaged in the business of selling such chattels. This fact must be a
material one, upon which the consumer must be expected to rely in
making his purchase, and he must justfiably rely upon it. 71
1310 (1979); Lewis & Sims, Inc. v. Key Indus., Inc., 16 Wash. App. 619, 557 P.2d 1318
(1976); S-Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Monier & Co., 509 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1973).
Arguably, the statement in question was too general to be relied upon by the plaintiff.
Thus, in Ford Motor Co. v. Taylor, 60 Tenn. App. 271, 446 S.W.2d 521 (1969), the plaintiff
was not permitted to recover based on defendant's reputation and advertisements because
the court felt these statements were general rather than particular. An interesting case in-
volving reliance and § 2-315 is Addis v. Bernardin, Inc., 226 Kan. 241, 597 P.2d 250 (1979).
The buyer placed an order for jar lids, but the seller informed the buyer it would not recom-
mend the lids in question for the buyer's product, salad oil. The buyer purchased them
anyway. When the lids failed to meet his needs, he brought suit based on § 2-315. The
Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the seller had superior knowledge of why his product was
unsuitable for buyer and, by failing to caution the buyer properly, had breached the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
68. 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, supra note 39, § 7.02[3]. The authors argue that
whether the seller possessed any particular skill or judgment is immaterial. The mere fact of
being a seller is sufficient indication to the buyer that the seller has the requisite skill and
judgment. Id at 7-28. The better view would seem to be that the buyer's selecting of the
goods does not preclude reliance by the buyer on the seller. Peters v. Lyons, 168 N.W.2d
759 (Iowa 1969) (purchaser's inspection of dog chain did not preclude reliance on seller's
clerk); Kurriss v. Conrad & Co., 312 Mass. 670, 46 N.E.2d 12 (1942) (plaintiff's selection of
dress did not preclude reliance).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402B. Section 402B reads as follows:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of material fact concerning
the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
70. Id
71. Id. Comment f (emphasis added). Special note should be taken of the requirements
[Vol. 35
PR OD UCT MISREPRESENTATION
For section 402B to apply, a misrepresentation as to the character or quali-
ty of the chattels must be made, and the person or company making this
representation must be in the business of selling any type of chattel.72 Offi-
cial comment b excludes from the application of section 402B a casual
seller, such as a person who sells his lawn mower at a garage sale. 73 Even
if a seller made a misrepresentation at a garage sale, section 402B could
not be used.74
Section 402B does not apply to mere statements of opinion, puffing,
sales talk, or commendatory trade statements. 75 While an action based
upon reliance on a mere opinion may not be possible, if the statement of
opinion is material a plaintiff might argue that it reasonably may be inter-
preted to include an implied assertion of the existence or nonexistence of
of reliance and materiality. These requirements in many ways make the problems of proof
similar to those encountered under deceit. Much of the analysis in this Article could also
arguably be applied to deceit. See L. FRUMER et al., supra note 9, § 1.03[l].
As an illustration of the problem of reliance, comment f contains a factual situation in-
volving an automobile represented as having a shatterproof windshield. Illustration 1 is
based on Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932), adhered to on rehear-
ing, 168 Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118, second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
Interestingly, the court in Baxter recognizes the changes that have taken place in the
American marketplace. The court makes the following observations as a justification for the
abandonment of privity:
Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, vast changes have
taken place in the economic structures of the English speaking peoples. Meth-
ods of doing business have undergone a great transition. Radio, billboards,
and the products of the printing press have become the means of creating a
large part of the demand that causes goods to depart from factories to the
ultimate consumer. It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit
manufacturers of goods to create a demand for their products by representing
that they possess qualities which they, in fact, do not possess, and then, be-
cause there is no privity of contract existing between the consumer and the
manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover if damages result from
the absence of those qualities, when such absence is not readily noticeable.
12 P.2d at 412. While the court thus recognized the changes in the methods of doing busi-
ness as a justification for abandoning privity, one might also argue that these changes merit
a departure from the requirement of reliance. If radio, television, etc., creates a demand for
a product, why is it necessary to point to a specific statement in the advertisement which
created the demand? The mere realization that advertising creates a demand seems suffi-
cient to justify imposing liability if there has been a misstatement of fact. See notes 114-35
infra and accompanying text.
72. The fact that § 402A does not depend upon a misrepresentation is the principle
distinction between § 402A and § 402B. 2 L. FRUMER & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8,
§ 16B[ll (1981).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, Comment b.
74. On the other hand, the buyer could rely on the theory of express warranty to re-
cover. U.C.C. § 2-313.
75. In interpreting the extent to which a purchaser may rely upon the statement of the
seller, § 542 of the Restatement (Second) is helpful, particularly comment d:
If the subject matter of the transaction is one which both parties have an
approximately equal competence to form a reliable opinion, each must trust
his own judgment and neither is justified in relying upon the opinion of the
other. . . . The fact that one of the two parties to a bargain is less astute than
the other does not justify him in relying upon the judgment of the other. This
is true even though the transaction in question is one in which the one party
knows that the other is somewhat more conversant with the value and quality
of the things about which they are bargaining. ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 542, Comment d.
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facts. In this case, the person or company making the statement might be
liable on the basis of an implied representation of fact.76 Alternatively, the
plaintiff might argue that the statement was material and the maker had
special knowledge of the matter the recipient did not have or that the
maker had successfully endeavored to secure the confidence of the recipi-
ent.77 In addition, the allegedly wrongful statement also must be a mate-
rial one of importance to the normal purchaser "by which the ultimate
buyer may justifiably be expected to be influenced in buying the chattel. '78
The rule stated in section 402B applies only to misrepresentations made
to the public at large that are intended to induce the purchase of a product
or to reach the public. The rule applies whether the representation was
made by television, radio, newspaper, or other form of communication. 79
A caveat to section 402B leaves open the question whether the section also
should apply to a representation made by an individual.80
To recover damages under section 402B, the plaintiff must establish that
reliance was justifiable and physical harm resulted because of the fact mis-
represented. If a purchaser either does not know or is indifferent to a mis-
representation, and the misrepresentation does not influence the purchase
or subsequent conduct, the plaintiff may not base a cause of action on
section 402B.8' The advertisement, however, need not be the sole induce-
76. Id § 539:
(1) A statement of opinion as to facts not disclosed and not otherwise
known to the recipient may, if it is reasonable to do so, be interpreted by him
as an implied statement
(a) that the facts known to the maker are not incompatible with his opin-
ion; or
(b) that he knows facts sufficient to justify him in forming it.
(2) in determining whether a statement of opinion may reasonably be so
interpreted, the recipient's belief as to whether the maker has an adverse inter-
est is important.
For example, could this section be applied today if Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290
Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939), were litigated today? (In that case Hudson advertised its
car as "A Rugged Fortress of Safety.") What does the buyer know about how a car is
constructed? Wouldn't the buyer be justified in concluding the seller knows facts sufficient
to justify its assertion the car is a rugged fortress of safety?
77. Is not one purpose of advertising, in any event, to secure the recipient's confidence
in the content of the advertised message? Otto Kleppner makes the following comment with
respect to a change in attitude of a consumer as a goal of advertising:
In the case of a company, advertising can generate a favorable attitude toward
it-the basis of most institutional advertising. Although there is no definite
proof that a person's favorable attitude toward a product is an assurance that
he will buy it, nevertheless, measurements of changes in attitude are widely
sought by advertisers as an index of how effective their advertising is in predis-
posing a person more favorably to the product or company. These studies are
of particular interest to heavy advertisers, and to corporations concerned with
their public image.
0. KLEPPNER, ADVERTISING PROCEDURE 523 (6th ed. 1973).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402B, Comment g.
79. Id, Comment h.
80. The caveat states: "The institute expresses no opinion as to whether the rule stated
in this Section may apply (1) where the representation is not made to the public, but to an
individual. ... Id § 402B.
81. Id., Comment j. A point explored later in this Article deals with the question of
whether a purchaser ever is influenced to purchase by an advertisement. Furthermore, if the
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ment to purchase or use the chattel, it need only be a substantial factor in
inducing the purchase or use of the chattel.82 In determining what consti-
tutes justifiable reliance, sections 537-545A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts are applicable, as far as they are pertinent. If such a false statement
is made to a person, no obligation arises to investigate to determine if the
statement is true or false,83 but a person cannot rely upon a statement that
he knows to be false. 84
The plaintiff need not establish direct reliance; the cause of action is
sufficient if only the purchaser of the chattel relied upon a particular state-
ment, provided that the injured plaintiff is a consumer.85 The mere fact
the injured party was unaware of the misrepresentation will not bar recov-
ery as long as he can point to reliance by the original purchaser. For ex-
ample, if a man buys an automobile in justifiable reliance upon statements
concerning its brakes, and he permits his wife to drive the car, the wife
may bring suit based on misrepresentation if the brakes fail and she is
injured, even though the wife never learns of the statements.86
purchaser is so influenced, some question might arise whether the purchaser could state that
a specific representation caused him or her to make a purchase. But see Markovich v. Mc-
Kesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958). In this case the plaintiff
claimed to have heard an advertisement on the radio for Prom Home Permanent and, as a
result of that advertisement, asked her nurse to purchase the product. Thereafter, she suf-
fered injury to her scalp. The court stated:
The plaintiff was induced to purchase "Prom Home Permanent" by defend-
ant's radio broadcast, urging its use with the statement that a neutralizer other
than water was unnecessary, making the application or use of its product more
convenient than those of other manufacturers. The product was purchased
because of the warranties published by the defendant. The defendant induced
the sale and is liable if the product thus bought does not comply with the
representations made and the health of the user is endangered when the prod-
uct is used as directed by the manufacturer.
149 N.E.2d at 186. Requiring a plaintiff to make such a statement is unreasonable because
in very few instances does advertising have such a direct cause and effect. The sale requiring
reliance very likely could encourage perjury. See the discussion in the text on advertising
theory and the accompanying notes 114-37 infra.
82. Of course, advertising probably never is the sole reason for a purchase. For exam-
ple, for a person to purchase an automobile solely because of an advertisement is highly
unlikely. The purchaser must be in the market for an automobile in the first place. The
requirement that the advertisement be a "substantial factor in inducing the purchase or use
of the chattel" is also unreasonable in that advertising theory questions whether an adver-
tisement is ever a substantial factor in making a purchase. See notes 114-37 infra and ac-
companying text.
Compare the issue of causation for pecuniary losses. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note
29, § 546 states: "The maker of a fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss suffered by one who justifiably relies upon the truth of the matter misrepre-
sented, if his reliance is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct that results
in his loss."
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 540.
84. Id. § 541.
85. Id. § 402B, Comment i. Consumer is to be interpreted liberally to include any per-
son who uses a chattel in a manner a purchaser might be expected to use it.
86. As an illustration of the problem of reliance, comment j to § 402B has an illustration
in which wire rope was misrepresented by the manufacturer in its manual. An employee
was injured who did not know of the misrepresentation. The employee was permitted to
recover. Id § 402B, Comment j. The illustration was based on the case of Mannsz v.
MacWhyte, 155 F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
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A number of courts have discussed the question of reliance. For exam-
ple, in Klages v. General Ordnance Equoment Corp. 87 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court found reliance by a motel clerk on a manufacturer's
brochure that indicated the defendant's mace would cause "instantaneous
incapacitation" when sprayed on an assailant. The manufacturer at-
tempted to raise the defense of voluntary assumption of the risk, but the
court found that no such defense exists under section 402B.
88
In Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales8 9 the plaintiff obtained an $800,000
judgment for deafness allegedly resulting from claimed inadequacies in
the warnings given by Bristol-Myers concerning its prescription drug
"Kantrex." Plaintiff's physician, an orthopedist, administered Kantrex to
the plaintiff after an operation. Physicians Desk Reference (a compilation
of prescription drug package inserts required by the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration) stated that Kantrex "has been used satisfactorily as an irri-
gating solution."90 Testimony by physicians indicated that the statement
was a positive assertion and that a prescribing physician could use Kantrex
as a continuous irrigant although the statement had been criticized in 1969
by the National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council be-
cause it failed to indicate toxicity from absorption and because the concen-
tration suggested for irrigation was excessive. The criticism
notwithstanding, Bristol-Myers continued to represent that Kantrex could
be used as an irrigant when it in fact was meant for a one time post-surgi-
cal wash. The intermediate court of civil appeals concluded the jury had
sufficient evidence to support its findings against Bristol-Myers. 9 ' On fur-
ther appeal the Texas Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff did not claim
that Kantrex was an adulterated drug or defective, but that it was
"ototonic" (having the potential to cause deafness) and that the warnings
given by Bristol-Myers for its use were inadequate and improper.92 The
court approved the jury verdict based on section 402B, but reversed the
case for other reasons. 93
The Colorado Court of Appeals recently adopted section 402B in Win-
kler v. American Safety Equipment Corp. 94 In this case a police officer ac-
quired for his personal use a discarded police helmet originally purchased
by the Denver Police Department for riot control. On the carton the man-
ufacturer depicted a motorcyclist wearing the helmet. The plaintiff was
familiar with the carton and believed the helmet was intended for motor-
87. 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 356, 367 A.2d 304 (1976).
88. 367 A.2d at 312.
89. 548 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977), rep'don other grounds, 561
S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
90. 548 S.W.2d at 423. The Physicians Desk Reference also stated "Kantrex injection
[Kanamycin sulfact injection] in concentrations of 0.25 per cent (2.5 mg./ml.) has been used
satisfactorily as an irrigating solution in abcess cavities." Id This is the statement that had
to be a misrepresentation justifiably relied on. See Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514
S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
91. 548 S.W.2d at 426.
92. 561 S.W.2d at 803.
93. Id at 804.
94. 604 P.2d 693 (Colo. Ct. of App. 1979).
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cycle use. Unfortunately, while riding his motorcycle, the plaintiff collided
with a pickup truck and suffered head injuries. The helmet performed as
designed, but the plaintiff claimed it did not perform as represented on the
packaging carton, that is, as a motorcycle helmet. The court of appeals
found that the trial court should have instructed the jury based on section
402B, in light of the evidence of justifiable reliance by the plaintiff on the
misrepresentation on the carton.95
Not every plaintiff prevails on the issue of reliance. In Franks v. Na-
tional Dairy Products Corp. 96 the plaintiff purchased some shortening for
his store from a meat company. The shortening was manufactured by de-
fendant National Dairy Products Corporation. While draining a pan of
the shortening, the plaintiff was sprayed with hot grease. The West Texas
federal district court found liability based upon section 402A. As to sec-
tion 402B, the court found the chief hurdles to be the identification of the
misrepresentation as to quality and the issue of reliance. The evidence of a
representation was a brochure furnished to users and a handbook for the
salesmen;97 however, the plaintiff testified unequivocally that he did not
rely upon the brochures or any other writing.98 As an alternative theory of
reliance (on a representation of quality) plaintiff argued that whenever a
product is placed on the market a section 402B representation should be
implied that the product would perform safely within the scope of its in-
tended use. 99 The court, however, rejected this liberal reading of section
402B because of comment h to section 402B. This comment and its illus-
trations indicated to the court that section 402B was meant to cover only
express representations. 100 The court also recognized that comment b re-
quires an affirmative misrepresentation as to quality or character. The
court stated that a contrary interpretation would make manufacturers ab-
95. Id at 696-97.
96. 282 F. Supp. 528 (W.D. Tex. 1968), af,#d, 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969).
97. While the trial court noted that the brochure and the handbook suggested how to
use the shortening, neither stated that it could be used safely. The court continued:
Of course, it could be contended that a term implied in the language is that the
shortening could be used safely; in other words, if a manufacturer expressly
states that a product can be used for certain periods of time in a certain man-
ner, then a user is justified in interpreting that express language to mean that it
can be used safely and without explosion for that period in that manner.
282 F. Supp. at 533.
98. Id.
99. Id This reasoning was suggested by the following dictum by California Chief Jus-
tice Traynor in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962):
In the present case, for example, plaintiff was able to plead and prove an ex-
press warranty only because he read and relied on the representations of the
Shopsmith's ruggedness contained in the manufacturer's brochure. Implicit in
the machines presence on the market, however, was a representation that it
would safely do the job for which it was built. Under these circumstances, it
should not be controlling whether the plaintiff selected the machine because of
the statements in the brochure, or because of the machine's own appearance of
excellence that belied the defect lurking beneath the surface, or because he
merely assumed that it would safely do the jobs it was built to do.
100. 282 F. Supp. at 533.
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solute insurers.10'
In Harris v. Belton 10 2 another plaintiff failed to establish reliance under
section 402B. Here the plaintiff sought to recover damages under a
number of theories from a retailer and manufacturer of skin tone cream.
Plaintiff introduced a magazine advertisement, 10 3 a standing poster adver-
tisement, i ° 4 the box that contained the skin tone cream, ' 0 5 and a statement
on the tube itself.'06 A pamphlet referred to on the package and tube re-
peated the manufacturer's claims and warnings concerning individual sen-
sitivity and also stated: "IMPORTANT: Do not use Artra [skin tone
101. The court reasoned:
If one adopts the plaintiffs contention that implicit in the presence of a prod-
uct in the marketplace is the implied guarantee that it will safely do the jobs
for which it was intended, then the section 402A requirement that a product
not only be dangerous (i.e., unsafe) but unreasonably so has been redefined in
terms solely of a representation of safe use; and the section 402A requirement
of proof (by direct or circumstantial evidence) of "defective condition" has
been effectively extinguished. At that point, we may well have reached the age
in which, at least as to safe use to prevent physical harm to consumers, we
have made manufacturers absolute insurers.
Id
In Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967), the plaintiff purchased a
truck in 1963. While driving the truck he hit a rock. The truck continued uneventfully for
about 35 miles when it left the road and tipped over. After the accident the rim of the wheel
was found to be separated from the spider. Section 402B was not presented to the trial court,
but plaintiff referred to advertising published by Ford to reinforce the claim that "a con-
sumer would have expected the wheel in question to be engineered and manufactured in
such a manner as to withstand the kind of force applied to it in this case." 435 P.2d at 810.
Although the plaintiff did not contend that this was a misrepresentation under § 402B, plain-
tiff asserted: "that advertising in general tends to create expectations of strength and dura-
bility, however, does not help a customer to form an expectation about the breaking point of
a wheel." Id The court noted that if such expectations existed, the record should contain
evidence to support the inference that such was the case.
102. 258 CaL App. 2d 609, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968).
103. The advertisement contained the following statements:
LIGHTER, LOVELIER SKIN BEAUTY FOR YOU . . . The ARTRA
PROMISE. Artra promises-a complexion fresh and bright as springtime.
Soft and glowing as candlelight! Artra, with miracle-magic Hydroquinone,
acts a gently [sic], but with deep-down thoroughness-to lighten and brighten
your skin. To cream your skin to luxurious softness, too. And without oil-
ness-because Artra vanishes! Try Artra today. That famous Artra look can
belong to you!
65 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
104. The ad read: "For a skin that is gloriously LIGHTER BRIGHTER SOFTER
Clears complexion New ARTRA SKIN TONE CREAM with miracle beauty ingredient
Hydroquinone." Id
105. The statement on the box read:
ARTRA SKIN TONE CREAM contains Hydroquinone lightens brightens,
softens skin. Skin Tone Cream is a greaseless vanishing cream for lightening
skin, with these additional skin care benefits. Softens skin-Eases removal of
blackheads-Protects skin against sunburn. Directions: Place small amount
of ARTRA on fingertips, smooth on face, arms, legs, etc. Allow it to soften
skin for one or two minutes. Place more ARTRA on fingertips and smooth on
skin until it vanishes. Use ARTRA once or twice daily, as desired. NOTE:
FOR FULL DIRECTIONS READ ENCLOSED PAMPHLET.
Id
106. The tube had the following directions on it: "NOTE: For full directions read ac-
companying pamphlet. Some individuals are allergic or sensitive to certain foods, drugs, or
cosmetics. If irritation appears discontinue use of this cream." Id at 811.
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cream] with other skin bleaches! Mixing Artra with other cosmetic
bleaches may lead to dangerous skin irritations. For best results, use only,
Artra .... ,107 The plaintiff purchased Artra at a beauty supply store
after she saw the poster and read the magazine advertisements. She did
not pay particular attention to what it could do but she claimed, based on
the labeling and advertising, the manufacturer expressly warranted the
cream as suitable for a given purpose, and she purchased it in reliance
upon the express warranty. 0 8 She also alleged a claim under section
402B, but the California Court of Appeals rejected this claim because a
warning was given and actually read by the plaintiff. 0 9
E. Strict Liability in Tort
In certain instances a plaintiff might be in a position to pursue a prod-
ucts liability case under the theory of strict liability in tort. This theory is
contained in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts1 0 and im-
poses liability on a seller for physical or property injury sustained by a user
of a product when the product is in a defective and unreasonably danger-
107. Id
108. Id at 814. The plaintiff also asserted a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose and merchantability. The court rejected all Code claims because they
"are for the most part recognizable as generalities promulgated to attract attention and sub-
sequent sales ... ." Id
109. Id at 816; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402B, Comments f, g, h,
and j. Another case in which the plaintiff was unable to establish reliance to the satisfaction
of the court and, thus, could not recover under § 402B is Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith
Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ). Steve La
Rocca brought suit against the dealer for personal injuries sustained when he was burned by
a split in the radiator hose. The dealer joined Ford as a third-party defendant for indem-
nity. Following a verdict of $109,224 against the defendant Russell & Smith Ford, and
judgment against Ford for full indemnity, the court found that the dealer had not relied on
the manufacturer's representations; thus, no recovery could be sustained upon § 402B. Id at
559.
In Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk, 122 Ariz. 174, 593 P.2d 924 (1979), plaintiff alleged that a
map prepared by Jeppeson & Co. (wholly owned by Times Mirror) and used by a jet in
landing at the Manila International Airport was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
The jet had crashed. The jury ruled against the plaintiff, but the trial judge granted a judg-
ment n.o.v. This judgment, in turn, was set aside by the Arizona Court of Appeals.
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402A states:(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
The rule stated in § 402A does not require any reliance on the part of the consumer upon the
reputation, skill, or judgment of the seller (unlike U.C.C. § 2-315), nor any representation by
the seller (unlike U.C.C. § 2-313). The seller's liability is not affected by limitations on the
scope and content of the warranties (as in U.C.C. § 2-316). Nor is the consumer required toive notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time after it occurred (as in U.C.C.
2-607(3)(b)).
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ous condition. The seller must be in the business of selling the product,
and the product must reach the ultimate user in a condition substantially
unchanged from the time it left the hands of the seller in order for a plain-
tiff to recover. Liability is imposed on the seller even though the seller has
exercised all possible care in preparing and selling the product and even
though no privity of contract exists between the user and seller. Section
402A does not require any reliance on a seller's representation or skill or
judgment."' Moreover, the seller's liability is unaffected by any limita-
tions on the scope and content of a warranty, and the consumer is not
required to give notice to the seller of his injury within a reasonable time
after it occurred.
The courts have adopted strict liability in tort to impose the loss result-
ing from a defective product on the party best able to bear or spread the
risk of loss. This party supposedly is in the position to prevent such defec-
tive products from being marketed; 1 2 thus the imposition of liability will
tend to force greater care in all facets of the production and marketing
process-a company cannot afford to do otherwise." 13
A seller may choose to create representations in a number of ways:
orally, in writing, on television and radio broadcasts, in newspapers,
magazines, on labels, in catalogues and brochures. Any one of these
sources, if it contains a misrepresentation, may give rise to liability. Re-
tailers, manufacturers, and endorsers may become liable if they misrepre-
111. 2 L. FRUMER & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, § 16B[l] (1981).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402A, Comment c states:
On whatever theory, the justification for strict liability has been said to be that
the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming
public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does
expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is being forced
to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by prod-
ucts intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be ob-
tained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of
protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are
those who market the products.
Judge Traynor's concurring opinion presents a famous argument in favor of imposing
such liability. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring). See, e.g., Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976), in
which the Kansas Supreme Court explicitly adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 29, § 402A. For a discussion of the Brooks case, see Note, Strict Liability in Tort
Adopted in Kansas, 25 KAN. L. REV. 462 (1977). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119-24 (1960).
Some authors take issue with the position that the producer is able to pass along the
additional costs imposed by products liability claims. This is particularly true of smaller
producers. See, e.g., Schwartz, Products Liability and No-Fault Insurance, Can One Live
Without the Other?, 12 FORUM 130, 130-31 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379,
161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960). Prosser observed that the move to strict liability was a major depar-
ture from the established law. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 794
(1966). On the other hand, there is a distinct possibility that through products liability suits
we are fostering an environment antithetical to business innovation.
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sent the attributes of a product, whether or not they intentionally
misrepresent the product. The courts have imposed liability on persons
who misrepresent the characteristics of their products even if they do so
innocently. The law has moved substantially away from the concept of
imposing liability only for intentional misrepresentation of the product at-
tributes. A seller today easily may unintentionally misrepresent a product,
and if this misrepresentation causes physical injury to the plaintiff, the
seller may incur liability to the injured party.
In the course of this evolution, however, the courts continue to cling to
the idea that the plaintiff must establish his reliance on the misrepresenta-
tion. In light of what we know today about the impact of advertising on
the public, the reliance element is becoming increasingly antiquated.
III. ADVERTISING THEORY
The imposition on the plaintiff to establish reliance in all product liabil-
ity cases except those based on an implied warranty of merchantability or
strict liability in tort cannot be justified in light of modern advertising the-
ory. The fact is that people generally do not view an advertisement and in
direct response to the advertisement alone, purchase a product. The con-
sumer is influenced by a number of factors besides any particular adver-
tisement, including friends and neighbors, brand loyalty, reputation of
seller, labels, marketing display, and distribution.' 1 4 The impact of adver-
tising is delayed and conditional upon interaction with other elements of
the marketing mix. The stimulation of demand for a product arises
through a combination of promotional methods." 15
On the other hand, people are influenced by advertising and other mar-
keting devices and in one sense or another eventually may be stimulated to
purchase a product because of an advertisement. Although any particular
advertisement might not be the source of the stimulus for the product de-
mand, it very well may be a powerful element contributing to the demand
for a product. For this reason, continuing to hold sellers responsible for
misstatements in their advertising seems logically sound, but insisting that
a consumer prove any particular advertisement led to a specific purchase is
highly questionable.
If we are speaking of national advertising, determining whether an ad-
vertisement has been successful is difficult. Because sales have gone up or
down simultaneously with an advertising campaign does not necessarily
mean that the advertising campaign stimulated or failed to stimulate de-
mand.'1 6 Before any judgment may be made of an advertising campaign,
114. C. SANDAGE & V. FRYBURGER, supra note 1, at 240.
115. C. PATTI & J. MURPHY, ADVERTISING MANAGEMENT 1 (1978). Some of the promo-
tional methods are personal selling, publicity, sales promotion, and advertising. These are
used in order to help a firm achieve its communications objectives: "creating brand aware-
ness; encouraging product trial; altering buyers' opinions, attitudes and beliefs; and generat-
ing sales leads--these are all communications tasks which must be performed if the
organization is to achieve its marketing goals." Id
116. 0. KLEPPNER, supra note 77, at 508.
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the result which a company seeks must first be defined. Merely increasing
dollar sales or market shares is not an advertising goal, but a total market-
ing goal. 17 In fact, an increase or decrease in volume of sales proves
nothing about the effectiveness of an advertisement. Only research can
attempt to determine the effectiveness of advertising." 18
Nonetheless, researchers find it difficult to assess the impact of advertis-
ing. John Treasure suggests several reasons why measurement of sales ef-
fectiveness of advertisements is a difficult task: (1) advertising is a
complex phenomenon; (2) competition may undercut the effectiveness of
an advertisement; (3) something else may occur in the market at the time
of the introduction of an advertising campaign; and (4) the effect, if any, of
advertising on the consumer is likely to be delayed.' 19 A person viewing
or listening to an advertisement is unlikely to be influenced by exposure to
a single advertisement as opposed to an entire campaign of multiple expo-
sures to several related advertisements; consumers respond to campaigns
rather than a single advertisement. 120
A strong argument can be made for the proposition that national adver-
tising seldom if ever causes an immediate purchase. A sale is more likely
to result from a delayed response after many exposures to advertise-
ments. 121 The thrust of an advertising campaign, for example, may be to
change the frequency of purchasing by people who have purchased a prod-
117. Colley, Defining Advertising Goalsfor Measured Advertising Results, Association of
National Advertisers, Inc. (1961 report), quoted in 0. KLEPPNER, supra note 77, at 509.
118. L. QUERA, ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS 173 (2d ed. 1977). Even with research, one
cannot always determine the merit of a given advertising campaign. Many results may be
inconclusive. Charles Patti & John Murphy comment:
Perhaps the most widespread misunderstanding of the research activity is the
notion that research results make decisions. Whenever management views re-
search in this way, they are often frustrated because results can be "inconclu-
sive." At best, research can only describe an environment and indicate
relationships within that environment. Ultimately, management must inter-
pret the data and then apply the results to the particular problem at hand.
Skill and creativity is required in using research as a guide to decision making.
C. PATTI & J. MURPHY, supra note 115, at 210.
119. Treasure, How Advertising Works, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 165 (Y. Brozen
ed. 1974).
120. L. QUERA, supra note 118, at 187. Quera observed that while a consumer may re-
member and react to one particular advertisement of a campaign, he more than likely will
be influenced to buy only after seeing or being exposed to several elements of that campaign.
Consequently, the tactic of a campaign normally proves to be more valuable for an adver-
tiser rather than a single advertisement. Quera also notes that findings of a survey con-
ducted by the American Association of Advertising Agencies revealed that 85% of all
advertisements make virtually no impression on consumers. Id. at 174.
121. C. SANDAGE & V. FRYBURGER, supra note 1, at 240, state:
The trite notion that national advertising gets people "to go down to the cor-
ner drug store right now and buy brand x" is far from reality. Buying action
resulting from such advertising is a delayed response that typically takes place
after many exposures to a series of advertisements over a period of weeks and
months. This is not to suggest that each advertisement should not invite ac-
tion. It simply means that it is naive to expect an immediate response.
Some argue that advertising does not create demand. "The theory is that advertising does
not create demand for a product but only suggests an outlet for preconceived wants and
desires." K.C. Star, Mar. 9, 1980, § E, at 8, col. 1.
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uct previously. These people often buy more than one brand of the same
product; thus, the seller through advertising may be attempting to increase
its share of purchases by current users of this type of product. 122
One major function of advertising is to encourage frequent repeat buy-
ing. 123 Advertising frequently works by reinforcing those persons who are
already convinced of the usefulness of the advertised product. 124 Because
of this multibrand purchasing pattern, a great deal of money is spent try-
ing to reinforce consumer buying habits. 125 The object of an advertising
campaign may not be to achieve brand growth (increase in sales) but
maintenance of an existing brand share. 126 Some authors have suggested
that an advertising campaign should merely be expected to "communicate
a message from an advertiser to prospective buyers of his brand of prod-
uct." 127
With all of this uncertainty as to the results of advertising, when is a
company likely to use advertising as a promotional device? There are a
variety of factors a company might consider in deciding whether to engage
in an advertising campaign. Patti and Murphy list three general catego-
ries: (1) product factors; (2) market factors; and (3) financial factors. 128
Some of these factors are beyond the control of the sellers, factors such as
the social or political environment or a competitor's price. Other factors
such as pricing or distribution can be controlled. Oftentimes they con-
verge and making causal inferences becomes impossible.
Products that a consumer cannot judge merely by viewing, feeling, tast-
ing, and smelling present the best opportunity for increasing that product's
demand through advertising, particularly if the basic motives for the
122. Treasure, supra note 119, at 162.
The role of advertising in sustaining a purchasing habit is further emphasized
when it is recognized that initial trial of a new brand--or, indeed, that of an
established brand by a "new" user-may well not be induced directly by ad-
vertising at all but, for example, by word-of-mouth recommendations. Given
a satisfactory product the distinctive contribution of advertising to the success
of the brand is likely to be the reinforcement of the buying habit once it has
started.
Id
123. Telser, Advertising and the Consumer, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY 31 (Y. Brozen
ed. 1974).
A general principle underlies not only the use of advertising but also the
pervasiveness of brand names. If a firm makes a product that consumers will
like, then it has an interest in encouraging repeat buying. Consequently, it
identifies its product in an easily recognized way and advertises. Customers
will recall their previous satisfaction with the product and will be inclined to
buy it again.
Id
124. Treasure, supra note 119, at 162.
125. Id at 154.
126. "As I have already suggested, the task of advertising in this situation is not prima-
rily one of conversion but rather one of reinforcement and reassurance." Id
127. L. QUERA, supra note 118, at .182. However, Sandage and Fryburger reject the no-
tion that the function of advertising is merely to communicate a message. They feel it can
do much more. C. SANDAGE & V. FRYBURGER, supra note 1, at 204.
128. C. PATTI & J. MURPHY, supra note 115, at 4.
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purchase involve strong emotional drives.129 If the product is in a market
that has been experiencing a long-term decline, advertising is likely to be
less successful. For example, a manufacturer who advertises wringer
washing machines will find advertising of questionable value. 130 Likewise,
the size and marketing strength of competitors, their brand shares, and
loyalty, as well as the state of the economy, will affect the success of an
advertising campaign. 131
While a great deal of advertising money is spent on consumer prod-
ucts,' 32 industrial marketers have less faith in the ability of advertising to
help stimulate demand. 133 Likewise, consumer durables (cars, refrigera-
tors, deep freezes, etc.) present special problems. 134 People are less likely
to be influenced by advertising as a product becomes more expensive, and
the role of a personal salesman becomes more important in closing a
sale. 3 5 Few people are likely to see an advertisement for an automobile or
house, and on an impulse stimulated by that single advertisement alone,
make a purchase. Much more likely is that the demand will build up over
time, and the consumer still will have to be coaxed into the deal by a per-
sonal salesman.
Thus, a consumer is subject to a number of forces in determining
whether to purchase a product. Even so, one can argue that a deceptive
advertisement might result in some additional sales, assuming all other
factors are suitable to a sale. Some writers believe that even if a seller
increases his sales through a deceptive advertisement, he will obtain only a
temporary gain, particularly if the product is one that the public buys reg-
ularly. Arguably, even with infrequently purchased products such as fur-
naces, funerals, and pianos, a seller will not profit from deceptive
advertisements because consumers learn about the product not only from
their own experience but from the experience of others.' 36 If a friend ex-
presses displeasure after buying a particular brand of automobile, you may
decide not to purchase that brand.
Nonetheless, a case can be made for regulation of deceptive advertising.
Robert Pitofsky, a former Director of the Federal Trade Commission's Bu-
reau of Consumer Protection, rejects the argument that free competition
will solve all the problems arising from deceptive advertising. He believes
the absence of repeat buying in many cases and an absence of advertising
that challenges false claims made by competitors makes government regu-
lation of deceptive advertising essential. 37
129. Id at 4-5.
130. Id at 5.
131. Id
132. Telser, supra note 123, at 27.
133. C. PATTI & J. MURPHY, supra note 115, at 2. The absolute size of U.S. industrial
advertising billings, however, is huge.
134. Id; Treasure, supra note 119, at 160.
135. 0. KLEPPNER, supra note 77, at 509.
136. Telser, supra note 123, at 30.
137. Pitofsky, Changing Focus in the Regulation ofAdvertising, in ADVERTISING AND So-
CIETY 136 (Y. Brozen ed. 1974).
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A case also can be made that advertisers who deceive the public should
pay persons injured by a product that was not in the condition it was rep-
resented to be in. The fact that the injured party did not rely upon the
misrepresentation in making a purchase should not preclude a suit based
upon a misrepresentation. That anyone relies upon any single advertise-
ment in making a purchase is unlikely, because the entire marketing mix
influences a purchase decision. If part of the marketing effort involves a
misrepresentation, the company should bear the responsibility for argua-
bly inducing sales through the use of a false advertisement. The fact that
the injured party, or the purchaser of the misrepresented product, is not
able to state specifically "I bought product X because I heard an advertise-
ment about product X" should not preclude recovery in personal injury
suits. A consumer purchasing decision may have resulted, directly or indi-
rectly, from the advertisement.
A realistic method of viewing the impact of deceptive advertising is that
employed by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 138 The FTC need not
prove actual deception or that the advertising actually influenced con-
sumer decisions. 139 Instead, the FTC tries to determine the total impres-
sion of the advertisement on consumers. 140
Arguably, the FTC is following a much more rational approach with
respect to deception than the courts follow when reliance on a misrepre-
sentation becomes an element for recovery in a products liability case.
The FTC does not require proof that people actually relied upon an adver-
tisement or were in fact misled. Instead, the Commission determines the
likely impact created by advertising. If the advertisement has a potential
to deceive, the Commission finds an advertisement deceptive. 41
A recent case illustrating the FTC's approach involves celebrity endorse-
ments. In re Cooga Mooga, Inc. & Charles E. Boone' 42 involved enter-
tainer Pat Boone, who agreed to pay damages to compensate purchasers of
a product he promoted in advertising. Boone appeared in print and on
television advertisements to promote Acne-Statin as an acne preparation.
In fact, no evidence existed to support the claim it would cure acne. Dur-
ing his endorsement of the product, Boone failed to reveal that he had a
138. See generally Symposium, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Deceptive Adver-
tising, 17 KAN. L. REV. 551 (1969).
139. FTC v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391-92 (1965).
140. Id A commentator notes that a mere showing of a misrepresentation is sufficient.
"[Tihe Commission need not demonstrate that specific consumers have actually believed
and acted upon the misrepresentation to their injury. All the Commission needs to conclude
is that a challenged advertisement has the 'tendency' or the 'capacity' to deceive consumers
by inducing them to rely on the misrepresentation." Reed, Advertising and the Federal Trade
Commission, in BUSINESS LAW KEY ISSUES AND CONCEPTS 100 (1978). The question is
whether the representation has the capacity or tendency to deceive, not whether it actually
deceived anyone. Resort Car Rental Sys. Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 827 (1975).
141. See Comment, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission. A Perspec-
tive, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 439, 448-49 (1979).
142. 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978). See generally Jones, Celebrity Endorsements.- A Casefor
Alarm and Concernfor the Future, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 521 (1980).
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close connection to the company selling the product. Commenting on the
significance of the case, Albert H. Kramer, director of the FTC Consumer
Protection Bureau, warned:
The negotiated order, while not a binding legal precedent, stands for
the principle that an endorser must verify the claims made about the
advertised product before the first commercial goes on the air or ap-
pears in print, or else risk FTC action. Unless the endorser is an ex-
pert on the subject, the endorser must look to independent reliable
sources to validate claims, tests, or studies supplied by the advertisers.
Failure to make a reasonable effort at independent evaluation could
result in personal liability for the endorser. 43
The FTC thereafter promulgated guidelines for authorized endorse-
ments and testimonials. 144 These guidelines forbid the use of endorse-
ments that are deceptive or could not be substantiated if made directly by
the advertiser.145 In essence, the FTC recognizes that an endorsement with
a false representation has a powerful influence over purchasers. If a celeb-
rity misleads the public as to the attributes of a product, the FTC may
bring suit directly against the endorser. In effect, the FTC recognizes that
product endorsers effect purchasing decisions by the general public and
assumes the likelihood of reliance.
If the FTC does not require evidence of reliance on the part of the pub-
lic in making a determination that an advertisement was in fact deceptive
and had an impact upon viewers, does it not seem reasonable to extend
this approach to private suits in the products liability field? Is it unreason-
able to argue that an advertisement the FTC might find deceptive also may
be deceptive to the purchaser of a product, even though the purchaser is
unable to say specifically: "I purchased the product based on a statement I
saw in an advertisement."? The FTC approach makes sense. If advertis-
ing arguably is deceptive, a not unreasonable conclusion is that it might
have had an impact on a consumer even though a consumer did not con-
sciously rely upon the advertisement in making a purchase decision.
IV. ELIMINATION OF RELIANCE AS AN ELEMENT IN
MISREPRESENTATION CASES
The requirement of reliance ought to be dispensed with in all cases in
which a consumer has been injured by a manufactured product. As noted
earlier, negligent misrepresentation, 46 fraud, 147 section 402B of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, 148 and the implied warranty of fitness for a
143. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (May 18, 1978) A-12-13.
144. 16 C.F.R. § 255 (1980).
145. Id § 255.1(a). See also ln re Leroy Gordon Cooper, Jr., No. C-2993 (F.T.C. Oct. 4,
1979) (consent order to cease and desist). In this case Gordon Cooper aided in promotion of
a device to aid fuel economy in automobiles. His pay was dependent upon the number of
products sold, a fact the FTC thought should have been disclosed.
146. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
147. See notes 9-16 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 69-109 supra and accompanying text. While the Restatement indicates
that the advertisement need not be the sole inducement to purchase, it must be a substantial
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particular purpose149 all require reliance. Furthermore, the plaintiff must
prove the statement was the basis of the bargain if an express warranty
theory is relied upon' 5°--something akin to reliance. Only the plaintiff
bringing suit under breach of implied warranty of merchantability or strict
liability in tort escapes the rigors of proving reliance.15'
Reliance clearly has been a major stumbling block for litigants who wish
to pursue a case based on a misrepresentation by the seller, yet the courts
in misrepresentation cases steadfastly have retained the requirement of es-
tablishing reliance.' 52 Simultaneously, the courts have recognized the im-
pact of modem marketing on consumer decision-making by their
willingness to discard the antiquated notion of privity of contract in order
to permit plaintiffs to bring suit.' 53 For example, the court in Markovich v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc. 154 recognized that the manufacturer attempted
to create a retail market for his goods, and the buyer would not have
purchased the product had it not been for the representations of the
seller.' 55 If the courts willingly abandon privity of contract in light of the
representations created by the seller, why have they been so unwilling to
forego the requirement of reliance in light of the very similar factors?
Through a complex system of marketing, consumers are stimulated to
purchase a product, although we may not be absolutely sure why a
purchase was made. For this reason, a company that makes misrepresen-
tations about its products should have to indemnify consumers injured by
a facet of the product that relates to the misrepresentation. If a company
says a windshield is shatterproof, and a person is injured because it is not,
he should not be required to establish reliance on any particular advertise-
factor. If a purchaser does not know or is indifferent to the misrepresentation, the plaintiff
may not rely upon § 402B. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 29, § 402B, Comment j.
Whether a person injured could establish an advertisement as even a substantial factor in a
purchase decision is questionable. This is particularly true if what is required is the pur-
chaser's pointing to a specific advertisement that he claims led to the purchase, as opposed to
an advertising claim. A more realistic requirement would be to require, at most, the plaintiff
to establish that the advertisement might have influenced the purchase decision. This could
be done by showing that the advertisement appeared prior to the time of purchase.
149. See notes 57-68 supra and accompanying text.
150. U.C.C. § 2-313, Comment 3.
151. See notes 48-56 supra and accompanying text.
152. In misrepresentation cases, the plaintiff must be someone who relies upon represen-
tation. See Prosser, supra note 112, at 837-38.
153. In Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958),
the court justified the abandonment of privity based on changes in the marketplace.
Occasions may arise when it is fitting and wholesome to discard legal con-
cepts of the past to meet new conditions and practices of our changing and
progressing civilization. Today, many manufacturers of merchandise . . .
make extensive use of newspapers, periodicals, signboards, radio and televi-
sion to advertise their products. The worth, quality and benefits of these prod-
ucts are described in glowing terms and in considerable detail, and the appeal
is almost universally directed to the ultimate consumer. . . . The consuming
public ordinarily relies exclusively on the representations of the manufacturer
in his advertisements.
147 N.E.2d at 615.
154. 169 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
155. Id at 274, 149 N.E.2d at 188.
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ment. All that should be required of the plaintiff is establishing that a
statement relating to a characteristic of the product was made and that it
was untrue. Reliance should not be part of the plaintiffs burden of proof.
The approach of the FTC with respect to deceptive advertising might have
a subconscious impact on consumer decision-making. This seems to be an
assumption behind holding celebrities liable for deceptive endorsements of
products.15 6
A rebuttable presumption should be adopted by the courts on the issue
of reliance; reliance should be presumed in personal injury cases based on
a false advertisement in the absence of clear-cut evidence presented by the
defendant. The burden of disproving reliance should be on the defendant.
The defendant should be required to prove that the plaintiff or the pur-
chaser of the product could not possibly have been influenced, directly or
indirectly, in deciding to buy. The current rule unjustifiably places the
burden of establishing reliance upon the plaintiff. This rule should be
eliminated.
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen that someone injured by a product may recover under a
number of theories of recovery. In most cases, the plaintiff need not estab-
lish that the product is defective but only that the seller made a statement
about the product that later is determined to be untrue, and that the plain-
tiff relied upon this statement. Reliance should be eliminated in all prod-
ucts liability cases where the element is currently required. The courts
instead should adopt a rebuttable presumption of reliance in cases of this
nature. Advertising theory does not support the proposition that consum-
ers purchase a product as a result of reliance on a single advertisement.
The notion that advertising leads a consumer to go directly to the store
to purchase a product no doubt contributed to the idea that an injured
plaintiff must establish reliance on the advertisement to recover damages.
The fact is that people are unlikely to purchase any product after an expo-
sure to a single advertisement. A buying response is more likely to arise
after viewing a series of advertisements, but even then, one cannot attri-
bute the buying response solely to any advertisement or series of advertise-
ments. A number of factors contribute to a consumer's willingness to
purchase a product: friends, neighbors, brand loyalty, reputation of seller,
marketing display, the competition a seller faces, and the economic times
all play a part in a purchase decision, along with other factors. Advertising
operates in conjunction with marketing in order to stimulate demand; it
does not operate in a vacuum as these rules for recovery seem to assume.
Furthermore, certain product characteristics determine whether advertis-
ing, as opposed to direct contact with the consumer, will be effective. For
consumer durables and industrial products, advertising alone quite clearly
will not cause a person to purchase a product. While it might be possible
156. See notes 142-45 supra and accompanying text.
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to say an advertisement caused a person to purchase a home permanent, it
is highly unlikely that a sale arose solely as a result of an advertisement.
Yet for a consumer to recover under most causes of action, the courts re-
quire him to establish reliance upon some statement in an advertisement.
This requirement cannot be justified in light of the fact that many factors,
not just advertising, result in a sale.
With the elimination of the defense of reliance, any one of the current
theories of product liability would become a much better and much sim-
pler vehicle for recovery. Modem marketing techniques stimulate de-
mand. If misrepresentations somehow are involved in stimulating that
demand, a company should pay for the consequences of its conduct. A
company that carefully avoids untrue statements would have nothing to
fear from such a change in the law. Only unethical or careless advertisers
would be penalized, and injured consumers would be greatly assisted in
establishing their cases.

